Flaming Tiger, Burning Dragon: Elements of Early Modern Vietnamese Military Technology by Dutton, George
EASTM 21 (2003): 48-93 
48 
 
Flaming Tiger, Burning Dragon: 
Elements of Early Modern Vietnamese Military 
Technology1 
 
 
George Dutton  
 
 
[George Dutton is an Assistant Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles. He specializes in eighteenth-century Vietnamese histo-
ry and has conducted research on a range of topics related to the Tay Son period. His 
publications include “From Civil War to Uncivil Peace: Army and Society in the Early 
Nguyen State,” in Armies and Society in Southeast Asia, c. 1750-2000, eds. Marie-Eve 
Blanc, Gilles De-Gantes, and Tobias Rettig (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, forthcoming), 
and “Crossing Oceans, Crossing Boundaries: the Remarkable Life of Philiphê Binh 
(1759-1832),” in Viet Nam: Borderless Histories, eds. Anthony Reid and Nhung Tuyet 
Tran (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming).] 
 
*   *   * 
 
Their main arm is a long lance, and they also carry some sa-
bers, some fire lances, guns, cannons and sometimes have 
elephants. They have many standards in order to make a 
great display; they spread out their ranks, it is said, to allow 
the cannonballs and bullets to pass through; they charge the 
enemy with loud cries, and after they make their retreat they 
go to sleep. If one of the two parties can withstand the im-
pact, the other will flee in disorder, and it will be arrogantly 
pursued. Their forts are surrounded by perches with soldiers 
...2  
 
This was the nature of Vietnamese warfare as described by a European mission-
ary in the 1790s. The description highlights many of the fundamental elements of 
early modern Vietnamese military technology and strategy that bear examination. 
Among other things, forts, elephants, cannons, and sabers, were all central to 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for the constructive comments of two anonymous referees who sug-
gested both further sources and useful refinements of the text. I also thank C. Michele 
Thompson for her editorial input during the revision process. 
2 Letter by M. Boisserand, Saigon, February 20, 1792, in Nouvelles lettres édifiantes 
des missions de la Chine et des Indes Orientales (Paris: Chez Ad. Le Clere, 1821-1825), 
vol. 7, 170. Hereafter Nouvelles Lettres. 
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Vietnamese military technology and to warfare more generally. The only essen-
tial element of traditional technology missing from this description is that of 
navies and naval warfare. This article is designed as an introduction to some of 
the central features of traditional Vietnamese military technology, with some 
reference to tactics as well. I propose to examine the evolution of locally devel-
oped military technology and also the introduction and adaptation of technology 
from outside Việt Nam. I will first consider the importance of military training, 
before looking at various forms of technology: the use of fortifications and walls; 
weapons of various types, including artillery and those using fire in its more 
elemental form; naval warfare and related technology; the role of animals, includ-
ing elephants and horses; and finally, miscellaneous devices related to military 
logistics, including transport, signaling and mapping. 
 Before I begin, some caveats. The survey I offer here is far from comprehen-
sive. This is a topic to which several volumes could easily be devoted. Rather, it 
is hoped that this article will serve as an introduction to some of the more useful 
sources for research on this topic, and that it will stimulate more detailed Eng-
lish-language studies of particular elements in the history of early modern Viet-
namese military technology. Secondly, this article largely glosses over an issue 
closely related to technology, namely its deployment through the tactics, ruses 
and stratagems that appear often to have been important factors in Vietnamese 
military triumphs. Indeed, while technology has played a critical role in the histo-
ry of Vietnamese warfare, Vietnamese use of strategy and knowledge of topogra-
phy have arguably been of even greater significance in determining the outcomes 
of many battles. The Vietnamese use of tactics and strategy, as well as ruses and 
various forms of ambush, thus bears examination in its own right.  
 For the purposes of this article I have chosen to end my examination in 1802, 
which marked the first year of the last Vietnamese dynasty, the Nguyễn 阮 (1802-
1945). This is partly because the modern (post-traditional) era can be said to 
begin at that point, but also because there is already considerably more infor-
mation available about the Nguyễn dynasty than about earlier periods. French 
scholars and colonial administrators commented extensively on elements of the 
Vietnamese military apparatus in the nineteenth century, and thus I have elected 
to examine the less frequently researched pre-Nguyễn dynasty period. In addi-
tion, this article leans heavily toward the eighteenth century, the period with 
which I am most familiar. With the Tây Sơn 西 山 uprising (1771-1802) and its 
attendant wars, this was a time of extended and often brutal warfare, and as such 
constitutes a useful arena in which to examine different types of traditional mili-
tary technology. It is also, not incidentally, the period for which the most exten-
sive pre-1802 documentation and description exists. 
 Finally, it is important to note that although the Vietnamese have certainly 
endured an incredible amount of warfare at different times and confronting dif-
ferent enemies (sometimes themselves), warfare should not be viewed as the 
single defining element of Vietnamese historical identity, nor should this dimen-
sion of the Vietnamese past be somehow understood as an innate aspect of that 
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identity. Rather, it has been carefully constructed and reinforced by a variety of 
historiographical projects. Given their audience and objectives, it is not surpris-
ing that early court historians emphasized conflicts with China to reinforce ideas 
about Vietnamese independence. Later historians sought to dramatize the con-
flicts of the seventeenth century between the Trịnh 鄭 and the Nguyễn. Most 
recently, twentieth-century historians have constructed a wide range of interpreta-
tions of the Vietnamese military past designed to reinforce particular political 
objectives. By considering warfare and related technologies in this article I am 
conscious of the fact that I may appear to be reifying the notion of Việt Nam as a 
society shaped, above all, by warfare. I hope that readers will recognize that this 
is but one element of the complex historical and cultural patterns of the Vietnam-
ese people. 
 
 
The Vietnamese and War 
 
It is an unfortunate reality that warfare has played a conspicuous, if sometimes 
overemphasized, role in the history of Việt Nam.3 From early confrontations with 
the Chinese through to the bloody battles of the twentieth century, the Vietnam-
ese people have repeatedly taken up weapons for a variety of reasons. These 
conflicts were often, but not always, with the Chinese, particularly prior to the 
thirteenth century. After a number of local uprisings against Chinese coloniza-
tion, the origins of which date to the second century BC, the Vietnamese finally 
gained their independence in 939, when Ngô Quyển 吳 權 named himself king 
after having dealt a major defeat to the Chinese the previous year.4 Thereafter, 
there were numerous Chinese attempts to reconquer the Red River region, includ-
ing three Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, an invasion and subsequent 
twenty-year occupation by the Ming (1368-1644) in the early fifteenth century, 
and another invasion in the late eighteenth century by the Qing (1644-1911). 
Consequently, the Vietnamese had always to be on guard against their northern 
neighbor. At the same time, the Vietnamese repeatedly came into conflict with 
their southern rivals, the kingdom of Champa 占 城. The eleventh through fif-
teenth centuries saw a series of intermittent back and forth wars between the 
Vietnamese and the Chams, including a forty-year period of almost uninterrupted 
warfare between 1350 and 1390. During this period, Cham forces attacked the 
Vietnamese capital at Thăng Long 升 龍 (the site of modern-day Hà Nội) in 
                                                 
3 In this article I will primarily use the term “Việt Nam” as a convenient, if imprecise, 
shorthand for a country that has borne different names describing geographical entities of 
various sizes and with various political centers. 
4 Vietnamese independence is also sometimes dated to 967, a reference to the time 
when Đinh Bộ Lĩnh 丁 部 領 named himself the first Vietnamese Emperor. See Keith 
Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 280. 
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1371, then again in 1377, in 1383, and finally in 1390, an attack that resulted in 
the death of the Cham ruler, Chế Bồng Nga 制 蓬 娥. Even this did not bring an 
end to the Cham attacks, for these were resumed in the early fifteenth century to 
take advantage of the Ming invasion and occupation of Đại Việt 大 越. It was 
only the decisive campaigns of the new Lê 黎 dynasty (1427-1789), late in the 
fifteenth century, that brought a halt to this pattern of conflict.  
 In addition to clashes with neighboring states, the Vietnamese also endured 
numerous internal conflicts since the earliest days of their independence. These 
internal struggles included, most notably, contests between competing noble and 
royal clans, as well as countless numbers of popular uprisings of varying intensi-
ty. Indeed, the usurpation of the imperial throne by a noble family, the Mạc 莫, in 
the early sixteenth century, commenced a period of almost continual internal 
strife that was to last until the French conquest in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. At times these internal conflicts were short-lived peasant rebellions, and 
at others, they constituted full-scale civil wars. In the course of the loyalist cru-
sade against the Mạc in the sixteenth century, two competing noble families, the 
Trịnh and Nguyễn emerged as co-defenders of the Lê throne. When the two fami-
lies had a falling out, the Nguyễn elected to move south to stake their claim to the 
frontier territories there. The Trịnh and Nguyễn subsequently fought a series of 
battles from 1627 to 1672, after which a cease fire produced a de facto boundary 
between the two sides. Each continued to claim loyalty to the Lê Emperor, even 
as the two families established autonomous political realms. 
 As the Nguyễn family expanded further toward the south, the campaigns 
against the remnants of the Cham state were revived. When the Nguyễn lords 
pushed even further toward the Mekong Delta in subsequent centuries, they also 
came into conflict with the Khmer state and lesser Khmer principalities existing 
in the delta region. These clashes with the Khmer led the southern Nguyễn rulers 
to become involved in protracted struggles among various court factions in what 
is today Cambodia, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century.5 This 
involvement was to last into the middle of the nineteenth century, when the 
Nguyễn dynasty (now ruling over all of Việt Nam) vied with the Siamese for 
control over the Cambodian political system. Indeed, the post-colonial period 
after 1954 saw a revival of the bitter contests over territory between the Vietnam-
ese and Khmers, a contest that reached its zenith in the cross-border attacks of 
the Pol Pot regime and the eventual Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 
1978. 
 This Nguyễn southward expansion was encouraged in part by the stalemate 
with the Trịnh that developed after 1672, for the truce with their northern rival 
allowed the Nguyễn to look south. The truce also brought with it a measure of 
internal stability in both regions, which lasted into the beginning of the eighteenth 
                                                 
5 For a description of these conflicts see Khin Sok, Le Cambodge entre Siam et le 
Việtnam (de 1775-1860) (Paris: École Française d‟Extrême-Orient, 1991). 
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century when it was shaken in both north and south. First, the Trịnh domains 
were rocked by a series of peasant uprisings that lasted from the 1730s into the 
1770s. Among other things, these uprisings were a response to inept rule, onerous 
taxation, problems of land distribution and devastating famines. Then, just as the 
last of the northern peasant uprisings had been quelled, the most significant upris-
ing in Vietnamese history up to that time emerged in the south. The Tây Sơn 
uprising was to last for more than thirty years, and embroil the entire country in 
bloody conflict. In the end, Tây Sơn armies almost entirely destroyed both the 
Nguyễn and Trịnh ruling families, forced the last Lê Emperor into Chinese exile 
and established their own regime. Warfare continued, however, between the Tây 
Sơn and one of the last survivors of the Nguyễn family, until the latter was able to 
vanquish the upstart rulers and establish his own dynasty, the (Restored) Nguyễn, 
in 1802. While the civil war had been brought to a halt, the harsh and frequently 
ineffectual rule of the Nguyễn provoked another round of peasant uprisings, 
which again were more or less continuous to the middle of the nineteenth century, 
when the French conquest began. 
 It should be clear from this brief recitation, that warfare has long been a reali-
ty of Vietnamese existence, a reality that prompted the Vietnamese to develop 
various types of military technology as well as to borrow or buy military materiel 
from abroad. What follows is a survey of some of the central elements of this 
technology, prefaced by a brief introduction to military training, an important 
element in the deployment of these various technologies. 
 
 
Military Training 
 
Technology was clearly instrumental to Vietnamese military successes, as will be 
described shortly, but well-trained soldiers and officers were also deemed to be 
of particular importance to military preparedness. Thus the Vietnamese sought to 
enhance the prestige and skill of their military officers by regularizing training 
and examination systems for military leaders at a very early stage. In 1225, the 
Trần 陳 dynasty (1225-1400) instituted an officer training school, designed to 
educate ranking military officials in contemporary strategy and tactics.6 A mili-
tary examination system was also developed, paralleling the civil service exami-
nation that served to recruit civilian officials: 
 
The military mandarins also had to pass an examination that 
was rather a physical than an intellectual test. They had to 
carry two balls of lead, each weighing sixty pounds, over a 
distance of sixty yards; they had to prove their ability with 
different weapons such as swords and halberds. Only after 
                                                 
6 Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam (New York: 
Praeger, 1957), 144. 
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they had passed these and similar physical tests were they 
subjected to an examination in military tactics, military his-
tory, and the institutions and history of their country.7  
 
The training for later Trần military schools would very likely have relied on what 
was the most famous treatise on military tactics, weaponry and history to be writ-
ten by a Vietnamese, Trần Hưng Đạo‟s Binh Thư Yếu Lược 兵 書 要 略 (Essen-
tials of the Military Arts).  
 Trần Hưng Đạo 陳 興 道 (1213-1300) was a noted admiral and imperial 
confidant of the Trần dynasty, when it was confronted by a succession of invad-
ing Mongol armies in the late thirteenth century. Faced with an enormous Chi-
nese force, the admiral urged Emperor Trần Nhân Tông 陳 仁 宗 to resist the 
Chinese, despite seemingly impossible odds. Trần Hưng Đạo‟s subsequent guer-
rilla warfare, concluded with a celebrated naval battle on the Bạch Đằng river 白 
藤 in 1288, gave the Vietnamese a decisive victory. He later elaborated his views 
on the arts of warfare in his Binh Thư Yếu Lược, which is a comprehensive exam-
ination of all aspects of the military arts, from forging weapons, to protocol, to 
tactics, to the use of weapons, fortresses and navies. It draws heavily on Chinese 
texts of various types as well as popular lore and personal experience. Side by 
side with techniques for deceiving the horses of enemy troops, the text contains 
advice on reading the winds, the sun, the moon and stars, and other celestial 
bodies as a way of predicting various types of events, from rebellions to bad 
harvests.8 It is thus a compendium of Vietnamese understandings of their world 
and the relationship between nature and society, as well as an instructional manu-
al for subsequent generations of Vietnamese soldiers. In addition to the Binh Thư 
Yếu Lược, Trần Hưng Đạo also wrote another training manual, the Vạn Kiếp Tôn 
Bí Truyền Thư 萬 劫 尊 秘 傳 書 (Book of the Secrets of the Military Arts 
Transmitted from the Vạn Kiếp), but this was reserved strictly for use by offic-
ers.9  
 During the Lê period (1428-1789), the Emperor, Lê Thánh Tông 黎 聖 宗 (r. 
1460-1497), himself issued a series of rules regarding training for the various 
branches of the Vietnamese military: naval forces, elephant forces, cavalry forces 
and foot soldiers. As the Emperor noted when issuing these rules, “Wherever 
there is a state, there must also be military training, and thus we should take ad-
                                                 
7 Ibid., 182. 
8 See the modern translation of this text: Hưng Đạo Vương Trấn Quốc Tuấn, Binh 
Thư Yếu Lược 兵 書 要 略 (Essentials of the Military Arts), trans. Nguyễn Phước Hải, Mã 
Nguyễn Lương and Lê Xuân Mai (T.P. Hồ Chí Minh: Nhà Xuất Bản Đồng Tháp, 1996). 
9 Trần Văn Giáp, Tìm Hiểu Kho Sách Hán Nôm, Nguồn Tư Liệu Văn Học Sử Học Việt 
Nam (Investigating the Han Nom Treasury: The Foundational Documents of the Literary 
and Historical Study of Việt Nam) (Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất Bản Văn Hóa, 1984), vol. 1, 252-
254; also Lê Thành Khôi, Histoire du Vietnam des origines à 1858 (Paris: Sudestasie, 
1992), 173. Vạn Kiếp refers to Trần Hưng Đạo‟s home village. 
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vantage of the periods of leisure enjoyed by the peasants temporarily to put off 
unnecessary tasks ... to teach them about the rules for sitting and standing, ad-
vancing and retreating, about listening clearly to the signals of the gongs and 
drums, so that our officers are trained with respect to matters of shooting bows 
and arrows, and that they do not forget their military training ...”10 Moreover, as 
Lê Thành Khôi has pointed out, the Emperor decreed that “every three years 
there would be an examination to verify the results among the soldiers: those who 
did not attain the average [score] would be punished, while the others would be 
rewarded with silver and clothing.”11 We also know that the Emperor personally 
supervised naval training exercises early in his reign in 1466 and 1467.12 He 
furthermore accepted suggestions for different types of military training exercis-
es, which he apparently monitored for their usefulness. In at least one instance, he 
punished officials who suggested training drills that proved to be less than suc-
cessful.13  
 Later, when the Trịnh family (fl. 1545-1786) effectively governed in the north 
in the name of the Lê Emperor, its leaders established their own complex of mili-
tary training schools and examinations. The first military school, reserved for the 
offspring of nobles and exam laureates, was opened in 1721. In 1724 a regular 
system of military examinations was established, in which tests were held every 
three years. The examination was composed of three parts. The first part required 
students to demonstrate their knowledge of an ancient Chinese military manual. 
The second part of the examination required students to show their horse-riding 
skills, as well as their ability to wield the sword, fighting pole and saber. The 
final part of the examination involved answering questions relating to military 
strategy. Different titles were granted to examinees depending on how far along 
they advanced within this tripartite structure. Those who passed this examination 
were eligible for a second examination, also composed of three parts of a similar 
nature. The successful candidates in this examination were eligible for a final 
examination held at the palace of the ruling lord. Those who were successful at 
this pinnacle of the examination system were called tạo sĩ 造 士, and considered 
to be equal to those who had achieve the doctoral rank—tiến sĩ 進 士—within the 
                                                 
10 Quốc Sử Quán Triều Nguyễn, Khâm Định Việt Sử Thông Giám Cương Mục 欽 定 
越 史 綱 目 節 要 (Imperially Ordered Mirror and Commentary on the History of the 
Việt), trans. Hoa Bằng, Phạm Trọng Điềm, and Trần Văn Giáp (Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất Bản 
Giáo Dục, 1998), vol. 1, 1015-1016. Hereafter Cương Mục. 
11 Lê Thành Khôi, 229-230. 
12 Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư 大 越 史 記 全 書 (The Complete Books of the Histori-
cal Record of Đại Việt), trans. Cao Huy Giu and ed. Đào Duy Anh (Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất 
Bản Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1972), vol. 3, 196 and 200. Hereafter Toàn Thư. 
13 Cương Mục, vol. 1, 1030. 
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civil service examination system, which offered a similar, graded series of exam-
inations.14  
 The southern Nguyễn rulers (1558-1774), in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, paid far less attention to formalized military schools or examinations, 
contenting themselves with creating a small number of training schools for horse-
back riding and marksmanship.15 They also organized elephant training schools, 
which the rulers themselves, at least in the seventeenth century, supervised. The 
Chinese monk, Dashan 大 汕, described such an elephant training drill in the 
1690s, overseen by the Nguyễn ruler, in which elephants and soldiers were re-
viewed for their fighting ability.16 Indeed, the Nguyễn rulers in the heavily mili-
tarized south were closely involved in the various other military training pro-
grams relating to naval and army drilling as well.17 In 1642, noting that naval 
forces he encountered on an outing appeared poorly prepared, Nguyễn Phúc Lan 
阮 福 瀾 (1635-1648) ordered that training exercises be organized in which local 
sailors would be schooled  in rowing and firing artillery, with rewards going to 
those demonstrating particular skills.18 Yang Baoyun notes that Nguyễn Phúc 
Chu 阮 福 調 (1691-1725), made considerable efforts to ensure ongoing training 
for his troops, and personally inspected naval, cavalry, war elephant and artillery 
exercises.19  
 The relatively informal training regimen of the Nguyễn was to change during 
their wars with the Tây Sơn regime (1771-1802). During this period, the surviv-
ing member of the ousted Nguyễn regime (and leader of the anti-Tây Sơn cru-
sade), Nguyễn Ánh 阮 映, apparently established formal military training schools 
employing a European military instruction manual that had been translated into 
Chinese, and which focused on the deployment of artillery and military tactics. A 
formalized system of naval tactics was also introduced and the Nguyễn officers 
received instruction in the use of signaling.20 
                                                 
14 This description is taken from Đặng Phương-Nghi, Les institutions publiques du 
Viêt-Nam au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: École Française d‟Extrême-Orient, 1969), 123-125. 
15 Ibid., 125. 
16 Dashan, Haiwai jishi 海 外 紀 事, in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyễn: Docu-
ments on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Đàng Trong), 1602-1777, eds. Li Tana 
and Tony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), 56-57. Hereafter Dashan. 
17 Li Tana, Nguyễn Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eight-
eenth Centuries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1998), 43. 
18 Quốc Sử Quán Triều Nguyễn, Đại Nam Thực Lục Tiền Biên 大 南 實 錄 前 編 
(The Preliminary Section of the Veritable Records of the Great South), trans. Nguyễn 
Ngọc Tỉnh (Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất Bản Sử Học, 1962), vol. 1, 72. Hereafter Thực Lục. 
19 Yang Baoyun, Contribution à l‟histoire de la principauté des Nguyên au Vietnam 
méridional (1600-1775) (Geneva: Editions Olizane, 1992), 111. 
20 John Barrow, A Voyage to Cochinchina in the Years 1792 and 1793 (London: T. 
Cadell and W. Davies, 1806; reprint, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
274. 
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Defensive Structures 
 
Along with training their soldiers, Vietnamese regimes took considerable pains in 
the construction of citadels, forts, and ramparts to protect troops and civilian 
political centers in many different types of conflicts. Defensive structures have 
existed in Việt Nam since the first millennium BC, and possibly earlier. These 
were constructed on a variety of scales, from the thick bamboo hedges of the self-
contained northern villages seeking to keep out bandits and tax collectors, to the 
large earth and stone ramparts designed to protect urban centers as early as the 
third century BC. The Chinese, during a millennium of control in Việt Nam, 
made no small contribution to the use of ramparts and citadels as defensive struc-
tures as well as administrative centers. In doing so they developed what has been 
called a “garrison state,” relying on well-protected military centers spread out 
across an occupied territory.21 In the course of anti-Chinese uprisings, and in 
later centuries after the northern colonizers had been driven out, Vietnamese 
military leaders and rulers built more ramparts of all types to defend their own 
capitals, as well as to protect the state apparatus against popular uprisings. 
 Yet we should be cautious in portraying Việt Nam as a land of fortresses and 
walls, for this was frequently not the case. Its fortifications were often built as 
short-term expedients in response to particular challenges: popular uprisings, 
threats to newly claimed political supremacy and the like. Although the evidence 
is sketchy and from a late period, what there is suggests that fortifications were 
not always a feature of the Vietnamese landscape. Alain Forest, in his 1998 arti-
cle “La guerre et le militaire dans le Tonkin des Trinh,” cites numerous European 
descriptions of the Trịnh north in the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth 
centuries as being virtually devoid of such structures. Political centers were open, 
with virtually no perimeter markers of any kind.22 It was apparently only after 
repeated threats to the Trịnh capital that such defenses were erected. Moreover, it 
appears that a similar situation obtained in the Nguyễn south. A Japanese visitor 
to the Nguyễn territories in 1642 reported that “The kingdom of Quinam has 
neither walled cities nor castles, so the king himself lives in an open plain.”23 
Later in the same century, Dashan too observed that “There was no city wall, not 
                                                 
21 See Paul Wheatley, Nagara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Ur-
ban Traditions (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, Dept. of Geography, 1983). 
22 Alain Forest, “La guerre et le militaire dans le Tonkin des Trinh,” in Guerre et paix 
en Asie du Sud-Est, eds. Nguyên Thê Anh and Alain Forest (Paris: L‟Harmattan, 1998), 
135-136. 
23 “Declaration of the Situation in Quinam Kingdom by Fransisco, 1642,” translated 
by Ruurdje Laarhoven, in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyễn: Documents on the Eco-
nomic History of Cochinchina (Đàng Trong), 1602-1777, eds. Li Tana and Tony Reid 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), 30. Hereafter Fransisco. Quinam or Quảng Nam was a name 
frequently applied to the entire Nguyễn kingdom, though it refers more accurately to the 
territories south of the Hải Vân pass. 
57 George Dutton: Flaming Tiger, Burning Dragon 
even close to the court, but many bamboos had been planted to serve as walls.”24 
Clearly, walled cities were not always permanent features of the Vietnamese 
landscape. 
 Despite the fact that there were times in which Vietnamese rulers chose not to 
barricade their political centers, it is clear that defensive structures have played 
important roles at various times and throughout Việt Nam‟s history. The earliest 
defensive structure for which evidence exists is the citadel of Cổ Loa 古 螺 to the 
north of present-day Hà Nội. This consisted of an enormous set of ramparts laid 
out in a series of interconnected earthen mound spirals, which gave the city its 
name—Old Snail City.25 These ramparts, sections of which date from the third 
century BC, had a circumference of more than 7.6 kilometers, were three to four 
meters high, twelve meters thick and had a base that was 25 meters wide.26 The 
site was accessible by water via a river system and the walls were encircled by a 
system of moats that made transport around the city easy, while further discour-
aging attacks.27 Although relatively little is known about this site and its evolu-
tion, discoveries of enormous numbers of bronze artifacts, including arrow heads 
and axes, suggested that Cổ Loa had been under the control of a powerful mili-
tary ruler in this period. The site continued to be viewed as useful, even after the 
Chinese came to dominate the region, for its fortifications were apparently built 
upon in the later Han period.28  
 Even prior to attaining independence from the Chinese, the Vietnamese con-
tinued to use and expand the idea of defensive structures. At the beginning of the 
eighth century, a Vietnamese named Mai Thúc Loan 梅 叔 鸞 rose up against the 
Chinese and proclaimed a new kingdom, styling himself as the Black Emperor—
Hắc dế 黑 帝—possibly a reference to his dark complexion. To prepare his de-
fense against the inevitable Chinese attempts to suppress his movement, he con-
structed as his political center a citadel of his own. This stretched for more than a 
kilometer along the banks of the Lam river 藍 江 in Hùng Sơn (south of the mod-
ern city of Hà Tĩnh).29 He was soon defeated by a Chinese counter-attack, but the 
remains of his rapidly-erected citadel are still visible today, an indication of Vi-
etnamese skill in the construction of such fortifications already in this early peri-
od.  
 In the first half of the ninth century, as the Vietnamese were growing increas-
ingly restless under northern domination, the Chinese tried to consolidate their 
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position in the south by building defensive perimeters for their capitol at Đại La 
大 羅. Early in the century, a Chinese governor of Annam built a double-ringed 
citadel against increasing threats to the Chinese presence. Then in the 830s, one 
of his successors tried to construct a defensive system of hedgerows and pali-
sades.30 These defensive efforts culminated in the project undertaken by the 
Tang general, Wang Shi 王 式. As Keith Taylor notes: 
 
He surrounded La-thanh with a high wooden palisade some 
five miles in circumference; it was built to last for decades. 
Outside the palisade, he dug a moat and filled it with flow-
ing water; beyond the moat he planted a barrier of thorny 
bamboo.31  
 
The walls of this defensive structure are said to have been eight meters high, 
while those of a protective dike around the perimeter were themselves four and a 
half meters high and six meters thick.32 Only a few decades later, and after a 
period of extensive turmoil, yet another citadel was constructed at Đại La for a 
new capitol in the 870s. This citadel had seven meter-high walls, was more than 
six kilometers in circumference and was further surrounded by a four meter-high 
dike.33  
 In the ninth century, Ngô Quyển 吳 權, the first Vietnamese king—having 
driven out the Chinese—reoccupied the earliest known Vietnamese citadel struc-
ture at Cổ Loa, making it the capitol of his own brief reign.34 Shortly thereafter, a 
new citadel was constructed further to the south at Hoa-lư 花 閭 near modern-day 
Ninh Bình, by Đinh Bộ Lĩnh 丁 步 領, who used it as his imperial center when he 
named himself Emperor in 968. This citadel comprised ramparts and defensive 
pits, and relied as much on the mountainous terrain as it did on man-made ele-
ments.35 Thereafter, the Lê and Trần dynasties returned the political center north 
to the banks of the Red River and the site of present-day Hà Nội, where a site just 
to the east of the earlier Đại La was used for the construction of a new citadel. 
The new citadel only surrounded the immediate palace grounds, however, leaving 
the rest of the city open.36 In the late fourteenth century, Hồ Quý Lý 胡 季 釐 
took power from the Trần and moved his capitol to a new location in Thanh Hóa 
清 化, quite far to the south of Thăng Long (present day Hà Nội). At the heart of 
this new administrative center he constructed a massive citadel, apparently in-
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spired by Chinese designs of that period.37 The structure consisted of enormous 
earthen ramparts with large gates topped by hewn stones weighing as much as 16 
tons.38 The walls of the citadel were 500 meters long on each side, and this cen-
tral structure was surrounded by another earthen rampart serving as a perimeter 
wall.39  
 As the Vietnamese were developing technologies of fortification, their south-
ern neighbors and sometime rivals, the Chams were similarly constructing im-
pressive citadels to defend against their Vietnamese foes to the north, as well as 
the Khmer to their south. Lê Thành Khôi has written that: 
 
Their cities were protected by walls of brick, flanked by 
guard towers of stone. The citadel of Khu-tuc, constructed at 
the beginning of the 5th century, was in the form of a rec-
tangle with a perimeter measuring 2,100 meters. This walls, 
with a height of 8 meters, were topped with wooden planks 
on which were raised towers, the highest of which were thir-
ty meters above the ground. The city had three gates. The of-
ficial buildings were all facing south and comprised more 
than 2,100 rooms. The population lived therein.40  
 
After the Chams were driven from their long-time capital at Indrapura late in the 
tenth century, they moved further south to found a new political center at Vijaya 
with its own powerful citadel. Many Vietnamese attacks against the Chams dur-
ing the campaigns of the eleventh through fifteenth centuries ended in failure 
when confronted with Cham citadels.41 Indeed, it is testimony to the strength and 
durability of Cham citadels, that the eighteenth-century Tây Sơn government was 
to turn the still considerable remnants of the citadel of Vijaya (known as Ðồ Bàn 
in the Vietnamese records) into their own politico-military seat.42  
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 Finally, in the period when the Nguyễn came to rule the southern part of the 
country, they built up their own defensive citadels against the threats posed by 
their Trịnh rivals in the north. Charles Chapman, an Englishman on a 1778 visit 
to Phú Xuân 富 春 (then being occupied by the Trịnh, who had seized it in a 
1774 campaign), provided a highly detailed description of one such structure: 
 
The fortification is an oblong square, the greater sides ex-
tending, as near as I could guess, half a mile, the lesser, two 
thirds of that distance. It is formed by a retaining wall be-
hind which a rampart of earth ten or eleven feet high was 
thrown up, with steps rising to a convenient level for the 
discharge of missile weapons. It had no embrasures, the 
guns being pointed through a kind of portholes (sic), made 
in the bottom of the retaining walls. The number mounted 
was about sixty, the largest nine pounders. For six or eight 
feet without the wall, short pointed bamboos from twelve to 
six inches long were driven obliquely into the ground; be-
yond these was a ditch, eight feet wide and as many in 
depth, fenced with bamboos growing which was succeeded 
by another space with pointed ones driven in the ground, 
and the whole encompassed by a low checkered bamboo 
rail.43  
 
Although the Nguyễn began by constructing these more traditional types of cita-
dels, they later began to adopt European approaches to citadel building. Specifi-
cally, the Nguyễn were aided by French advisors in designing and constructing 
new citadels incorporating elements of the Vauban style during their conflict with 
the Tây Sơn.  
 The first of these structures was erected in 1790 in the Sài Gòn area, then 
under Nguyễn control. While the new citadels were being built with the assis-
tance of French advisors, the Nguyễn continued to use traditional design features. 
Thus, for example, as Alexander Woodside has pointed out, the Sài Gòn citadel 
was “designed Chinese-style as an „eight-diagrams city‟ (bát quái thánh), as an 
octagonal, lotus-shaped settlement with eight gates.”44 The Nguyễn court records 
of the nineteenth century described the citadel in the following manner: 
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Construction of the citadel followed the pattern of the octa-
gon, with openings for eight doors, and in the middle a pal-
ace; on the left-hand side was erected the Thái miếu temple, 
and behind the temple was a warehouse, and on the right-
hand side was set up a bureau for manufacturing, and all 
around were grass thatched houses for the guards who 
would be staying there. In the middle of the field was erect-
ed a three story flag tower, on which was placed an octago-
nal observation post, where a flag could be raised in the day-
time, and at night a torch lit to serve as a signal for all the 
soldiers ... The eight gates of the citadel were all constructed 
out of laterite ... Horizontally and vertically there were eight 
streets. From east to west their length was 524 meters, from 
south to north the (measurements) were the same, (while) 
the height was 5.2 meters, (and) the base was 30 meters. 
Around the outside of the citadel was a moat. The moat‟s 
breadth was 42 meters, its depth was 5.6 meters, and there 
was a bridge crossing it to the north. The exterior circumfer-
ence of the citadel was 3176 meters.45  
 
Another such citadel was constructed at Diên Khánh 延 慶 in 1793. This fort, 
sections of which still survive, was located inland and to the northwest of Nha 
Trang. It was to be the site of considerable struggle between the Tây Sơn and 
Nguyễn throughout the 1790s.46 Subsequently, citadels of this type were to dom-
inate Nguyễn defensive structures of the nineteenth century, as the Vietnamese 
rulers adopted the European model in this respect. 
 
* * * 
 
While the Vietnamese, and their Cham neighbors constructed a great many cita-
dels, another important element of Vietnamese defensive architecture was the 
free-standing wall. Such structures were frequently erected with great rapidity, to 
meet immediate needs, while at the same time requiring relatively sophisticated 
engineering skills to adapt construction to topography. In the eleventh century, 
and facing an invasion by the Chinese, Lý Thương Kiệt 李 常 傑 erected an 
earthen wall along the southern bank of a river just north of Thăng Long to de-
fend his capitol. More than one hundred kilometers in length, the wall was sever-
al meters high and reinforced by bamboo spikes.47 Later, in the fifteenth century, 
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Vũ Hữu 武 有 (1444-1530) and Lương Thế Vinh 梁 世 榮 (1444-?) both scholars 
of the highest order, wrote a major treatise on the subject, Đại Thành Toán Pháp 
大 成 算 法—Rules for the Calculating of Great Walls.48 This text, in addition to 
its practical military applications, constitutes one of the very few surviving pre-
nineteenth-century Vietnamese treatises on mathematics.  
 During the Trịnh-Nguyễn civil war of the seventeenth century, defensive 
walls raised by the southern Nguyễn state were a central feature of the conflict. 
The most famous of these structures was a pair of long walls constructed as the 
primary Nguyễn defense against their northern rival.49 The more important of the 
two structures was the Đồng Hới 洞 海 wall, constructed in 1631. When complet-
ed, it was 18 kilometers long and more than six meters tall. A second such struc-
ture, the Nhật Lệ 日 麗 rampart, completed in the fall of 1630, was described by 
nineteenth-century court histories of the Nguyễn as follows: 
 
The ramparts were four meters high, and the outside was 
supported by ironwood, while inside was earth, and this cre-
ated five steps, where elephants and horses could walk, and 
it also relied on the mountains at its sides. Altogether it was 
twelve kilometers in length, and every four meters was 
placed a painted cannon, and at distances of twelve to twen-
ty meters was placed a long artillery piece, and a large bore 
cannon. And the ammunition was stacked up like moun-
tains.50 
 
In addition to these structures, the Nguyễn also had a series of smaller walls fur-
ther to the south of the Đồng Hới line. Collectively these ramparts were particu-
larly valuable to the southern forces, which were in a defensive posture in five of 
their six wars with the Trịnh during the middle of the seventeenth century. The 
Trịnh forces never successfully breached these walls, and it was only the collabo-
ration of Nguyễn officials during the upheaval of the 1770s that permitted the 
Trịnh to pass through the ramparts during their 1774 campaign against the 
Nguyễn.  
 
 
Traditional Weaponry 
 
Even as they developed defensive structures of various types, the Vietnamese 
naturally employed a broad range of offensive tools, and made early use of a 
wide range of weapons in their battles with the Chinese. These included both 
domestically-developed and Chinese-style arms. Bronze spears, swords and ar-
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rowheads were used at a very early stage. Lê Thành Khôi describes the armies of 
the semi-legendary king, An Dương Vương 安 陽 王 as featuring: “redoubtable 
archers, using poisoned or flaming arrows [and] soldiers armed with lances, 
spears, daggers, short swords, axes, and armor.”51 Excavations from bronze-age 
sites in the north of the country, dating to the middle of the first millennium BC, 
have revealed a great many artifacts that might have been used for military pur-
poses, including arrowheads, spear-points, bronze halberds, and battle axes of 
various sizes.52 Of the weapons from this early period, among the most effective 
were the bronze pediform axe and the crossbow. The former was apparently 
evolved from the earlier rectangular stone axe, and was a particularly useful 
weapon that could be used both for chopping and for thrusting.53 It was one of 
many cast bronze weapons being produced in an area with very highly developed 
bronze-working skills by around 500 BC.54 The crossbow was perhaps even 
more lethal, capable of launching arrows (by means of a trigger mechanism) at a 
very high velocity. Keith Taylor notes that this weapon, for which surviving 
evidence is the trigger mechanism itself, was one that Austroasiatic peoples in the 
south developed and that was later adopted to great effect by the Chinese.55 
Clearly weapons technologies flowed both north and south during this early peri-
od. 
 Each of these various types of traditional weapons played an important role in 
battle, but it was the sword, as in many other cultures, that developed a special 
mystical status. The most famous sword in Vietnamese history is that allegedly 
presented to the Vietnamese military hero Lê Lợi 黎 利 by a turtle that emerged 
from the depths of a lake in the capitol—Thăng Long. This sword was to be used 
to rescue the nation from the Ming occupation of the early fifteenth century. 
After victory had been achieved, the turtle resurfaced and requested the return of 
the sword, which had now fulfilled its mission. The lake in the center of the old 
part of Hà Nội today still bears the name Hồ Hoàn Kiếm 湖 還 劍—the Lake of 
the Restored Sword.  
 Magical swords, similar to that used by Lê Lợi, played prominent roles at 
other times of political crisis as well. Most notably, numerous references to such 
weapons are found in the lore about the eighteenth-century Tây Sơn movement. 
One tale from this period metaphorically describes the unifying power of the Tây 
Sơn, reporting that the eldest rebel leader, Nguyễn Nhạc 阮 岳, found the blade 
of a precious sword in the coastal plains and then discovered its matching handle 
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in the interior highlands area. A variant of this tale states that Nhạc discovered 
the sword‟s blade embedded in a stone, and that he alone had the strength to 
withdraw it. Then, on visiting a Bahnar highland village, he was presented with 
an enormous fowl, which when opened revealed the matching handle. Once the 
two pieces were joined they could no longer be separated.56 Of this same inci-
dent, the Nguyễn dynasty‟s nineteenth-century account, the Đại Nam Liệt Truyện 
大 南 列 傳, merely noted that “On the road through the mountains of An Dương, 
Nhạc found a sword that he claimed was a spirit sword. He used this to delude 
the people and many believed him.”57 These and many similar tales make clear 
the mystical importance that weapons could possess, and also linked weapons 
specifically to heroic figures, either defenders of the nation against outside ene-
mies, or defenders of the people against oppressive officials. 
 Although swords, long and short, one and two-handed, curved and straight, 
were important weapons, other types of weapons also contributed to the Viet-
namese arsenal. Mention has already been made of the crossbow, which was 
developed at a very early stage. Conventional bows and arrows were also com-
mon, frequently made more dangerous by setting ablaze the tips of the arrows. 
Spears and other thrown weapons were also important, and were sometimes 
wielded by cavalrymen.58 Among these was the “lao” a type of extra-long jave-
lin, made of a very hard wood and with an extra barb at the end. This weapon 
was considered one of the most dangerous in the Vietnamese arsenal, useful for 
fending off attacking enemy swordsmen from a distance.59 Finally, the Vietnam-
ese did also use much larger weapons, including catapults, which were intro-
duced by the Chinese and employed as early as 1059.60 All of these types of 
weapons continued to be the central elements of the Vietnamese military arsenal 
in subsequent centuries. They remained inexpensive and relatively easy to pro-
duce, and were readily wielded in rapidly moving military campaigns. Moreover, 
even as the Vietnamese began to use firearms in their confrontations with the 
Chinese and the Chams, the older technologies continued to predominate. Since 
the new types of arms required considerable investment in their casting or pur-
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chase, and training for their use, these were used to supplement, rather than to 
replace the older technology. 
 When was artillery technology first incorporated into the Vietnamese arsenal? 
The earliest recorded Vietnamese use of artillery appears to date to the fourteenth 
century. Hồ Quý Lý is said to have developed a formidable piece of artillery 
known as the súng thần cơ 統 神 機 which hurled a variety of different sized 
cannonballs that could either kill soldiers or destroy structures.61 This was appar-
ently not long after the first Chinese use of the same types of weapons.62 Sun 
Laichen has recently examined technology transfer between the Ming and the 
Vietnamese during the course of the Ming occupation of the first three decades of 
the fifteenth century. He argues that it was Ming artillery strength that allowed 
the Chinese to overwhelm Vietnamese defenses and occupy the country, and that 
it was this same Ming artillery that played an important role in the eventual Viet-
namese defeat of the occupation army.63 Specifically, he argues that the Viet-
namese were able to acquire Ming arms from defectors or captured troops, and to 
use these weapons as models for domestically manufactured versions. Gradually, 
under Lê Lợi‟s command, the Vietnamese were able to build up a Ming-style 
arsenal that they were then able to direct against the Chinese forces. After the Lê 
victory, state workshops of the new dynasty, in addition to crafting bows and 
arrows, lances, and swords, also continued to produce copper cannons (hỏa 
đồng).64 Indeed, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, Tomé Pires was able 
to observe that the Vietnamese had “countless musketeers and small bom-
bards.”65  
 It was not, however, until the late sixteenth century and then into the period of 
the standoff between the Nguyễn and the Trịnh in the seventeenth, that artillery 
became a central element of Vietnamese military confrontations. In the latter half 
of the sixteenth century, the Nguyễn, apparently already had access to various 
types and sizes of cannons. The first Nguyễn leader in the south, Nguyễn Hoàng 
阮 潢, returned to the north in the 1590s for some time, to assist the Lê in 
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fighting off a strong challenge from the Mạc family. In one battle with the Mạc, 
while the Trịnh were unable to breach the enemy ramparts, Nguyễn Hoàng, used 
“fire weapons and large cannons of all sorts” to destroy the enemy fortification 
and rout the Mạc forces.66 This suggests that in terms of artillery, at this early 
stage, the southern forces were considerably more advanced than their northern 
counterparts, despite the earlier Lê casting of artillery pieces. It also suggests the 
important role that artillery would come to play in siege warfare of the seven-
teenth through nineteenth centuries. 
 During the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars in the middle of the seventeenth century 
(1627-1672), each side depended heavily on artillery during their various cam-
paigns. To assist them in fully equipping their armies, both drew on European 
expertise in the casting of armaments. A number of European trading companies 
were permitted to establish factories in north and south for the express purpose of 
supplying the Vietnamese with European-style cannons. In the north, the Dutch 
established trading factories in Phố Hiến 舖 憲 in 1637, and soon thereafter in 
Thăng Long itself. They became important suppliers of artillery to the Trịnh 
throughout the seventeenth century. By the end of that century, Dampier was able 
to report that the Trịnh had in their possession at least 60 iron cannons, and sev-
eral bronze ones, the largest of these weighing nearly 3.5 tonnes, and perhaps 
designed, as he noted, more for show than for actual combat use.67  
 In the south, the Nguyễn allowed the Portuguese to establish a cannon-casting 
foundry near Phú Xuân, the first some time before 1615, and the second in 
1631.68 Although initially relying on weapons produced by European craftsmen, 
by the late seventeenth century and certainly in the eighteenth, the Nguyễn had 
already become much more sophisticated at casting their own cannons. Conse-
quently, the number of artillery pieces in their possession increased considerably. 
Pierre Poivre, visiting the southern court in the mid-eighteenth century noted the 
presence of more than 1,200 bronze cannons in the Nguyễn ranks.69 It appears 
that the Nguyễn cannons continued to be superior to Trịnh artillery during the 
conflict between the two sides, and the combination of Nguyễn fortifications 
integrated with artillery pieces, was sufficient to prevent any Trịnh armies from 
penetrating the Nguyễn defenses. Thus, although Trịnh forces appear to have had 
an overwhelming numerical advantage during these wars (100,000 troops to 
perhaps 50,000), the Nguyễn were able to use their particular technological ad-
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vantages to halt the Trịnh advances.70 Indeed, the strength of Nguyễn fire-power 
and their skill in wielding artillery at this time were both demonstrated in a 1643 
encounter, during which their ship-mounted cannons completely destroyed a 
small Dutch fleet.71  
 Despite wielding a formidable artillery arsenal in the seventeenth century, it 
seems that by the middle of the eighteenth century the Nguyễn had lost some of 
their knowledge of, and need for, these weapons. The wars with the Trịnh had 
ended in 1672, and for the next century the Nguyễn faced only minor challenges 
from peasant unrest and skirmishes with Cambodians in the Mekong delta region. 
When Europeans arrived in the middle of that century, they noted that the 
Nguyễn artillery had already fallen into very poor condition. Poivre, for example, 
while noting the large number of cannons in the possession of the Nguyễn, also 
reported that “the Cochinchinese take no notice, or are unaware, of what could 
make this artillery more useful. None of the cannons has got six shots to fire and 
most of the cannonballs are not of the right caliber.”72 Consequently, it is not 
surprising that when the Tây Sơn rose up in the 1770s, the Nguyễn did not have 
the artillery to respond to Tây Sơn attacks on their forts or cities, and apparently 
did not fire a single cannon against the rebel armies.73 Thus, finding themselves, 
at times, at a technological and resource disadvantage relative to the Tây Sơn, the 
Nguyễn were occasionally forced to improvise. For example, during some of the 
battles of the mid-1790s, it was reported by a European eyewitness that the 
Nguyễn supplemented their armaments with wooden mock cannons, painted 
black to deceive the Tây Sơn forces confronting them.74  
 While the Nguyễn appear, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, to have 
lost their former artillery advantage, the Trịnh apparently had fairly strong artil-
lery at this same time. When Charles Chapman visited Phú Xuân in 1778, he and 
his men became embroiled in a dispute with their Trịnh hosts, which degenerated 
into a brief but intense skirmish. For several days the Englishmen sat relatively 
helpless on their vessel, anchored in a bay near the capitol while Trịnh shore 
batteries pounded their vessel, using shot as large as nine pounds. Although the 
Englishmen were eventually able to escape, the sustained barrage put up by the 
Trịnh during this period argues for a relatively well-developed and readily de-
ployed artillery technology in their hands during this period.75  
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 Finally, while the Vietnamese clearly possessed and used larger artillery piec-
es during the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, they also deployed soldiers 
wielding smaller handguns. Sun Laichen argues that the Vietnamese employed 
handguns, as distinct from larger cannons, as early as 1390, when such a device 
was used to shoot and kill the Cham ruler, Chề Bống Nga.76 The Lê subsequently 
expanded the production and deployment of handguns in addition to larger artil-
lery pieces. By the seventeenth century, as Anthony Reid has pointed out, “mus-
kets became a major item of trade,” and “Cochinchina made most effective use of 
them, organizing its entire adult male population along military lines.”77 Later, in 
the late eighteenth century, Chapman also reported that in addition to artillery 
pieces, the Vietnamese made use of handguns of various types. Visiting Trịnh-
controlled Phú Xuân in 1778, he observed that the Vietnamese had “long match-
locks which had swivels and three-legged stands to fire them on.” These, the 
local military commander claimed, had been manufactured locally.78 Indeed, the 
Trịnh also had muskets by this time, and both sides were apparently recognized 
for having highly skilled marksmen.79  
 
* * * 
 
Although the Vietnamese were using guns and cannons by the fourteenth century, 
they continued to use fire in its more elemental form as an important weapon. 
Fire would have been, and has remained, a particularly powerful weapon in a 
country where virtually every structure, from palaces to simple houses, was con-
structed of wood. There were, of course, earth-reinforced ramparts of many 
types, but within those outer walls were military or political centers whose edific-
es would have been largely, if not entirely, constructed of highly flammable ma-
terial. Fire also constituted a simple and cheap weapon that could be readily 
produced from materials at hand.  
 Weapons of fire were used very early by the Vietnamese, though how early is 
not entirely clear. The nineteenth-century Nguyễn history, Việt Sử Thông Giám 
Cương Mục 越 史 通 鑑 綱 目, describes the Chinese use of fire weapons to 
destroy citadels in Vietnamese territory as early as 111 BC.80 Prior to the intro-
duction of artillery, the Vietnamese almost certainly employed a variety of fairly 
simple fire weapons, including flaming arrows and spears, and other traditional 
weapons enhanced by the addition of flames. A considerable advance in this 
technology took place under the Lê regime when the Vietnamese developed an 
expanded arsenal of “flame throwers,” using a technology borrowed from the 
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Ming.81 Indeed, such devices were apparently being used in China as early as the 
tenth century.82 The Vietnamese were able to construct their own flame throwing 
devices in a variety of sizes, possibly fashioning them from heavy bamboo as in 
China. These would have used some form of incendiary oil, propelled from the 
tube with a plunger, a design that could have yielded several minutes of continu-
ous flame.83  
 The most numerous and vivid descriptions of the use of fire as a weapon are 
found during the Tây Sơn period of the last three decades of the eighteenth centu-
ry. Although both Tây Sơn and Nguyễn forces made use of cannons, more fre-
quent, and perhaps more effective, use was made of simpler weapons of fire that 
could be readily deployed by the large, often ill-trained armies fielded by each 
side. One rudimentary, but particularly effective, fire device of this period was 
used by the Nguyễn in a manner that rendered it one of the most feared weapons 
of its time. A Spanish missionary observer of the period gave the following de-
scription of the device: 
 
[It is] a stick made of thorny wood, very abundant in the 
forests, on which they left the thorns, so that it was barbed 
like a fish hook ... where the upper part is coated with three 
or four layers of pine tar wrapping the leaves, to fashion it 
into a sort of taper (candle). When they wanted to use this 
weapon in battle, they would set the pine tar on fire, and 
then they would brandish it to the left and right, much like a 
holy water sprinkler; those who found themselves sprinkled 
with this seeming holy water would find themselves sent to 
the next world. They would use the thorny baton in throwing 
it at the enemy; a victim, caught like a fish on its numerous 
barbs, would see the impossibility of moving, and fall into 
the hands of his enemies, and there was no sort of garb that 
could defend against the barbs.84  
 
Another contemporary observer noted a similar Tây Sơn penchant for using fire-
weapons. He wrote of the rebels that “their weapons were usually flaming arrows, 
or flaming poles at the top of which they had attached lances, and these were 
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called flaming tigers—hỏa hổ 火 虎.”85 During their 1789 war with the Chinese, 
the Tây Sơn forces continued to wield these “flaming tigers,” and although we do 
not have a precise description of the the manner in which it was employed, a 
Chinese general described it as a weapon designed to set fire to soldiers‟ uni-
forms.86 During the same encounter with the Chinese, people living in the region 
of Khương Thương-Đống Đa, in Thăng Long, devised another type of incendiary 
weapon known as a fire dragon (rồng lửa 龍 火. This was developed by creating 
the image of a dragon out of a type of local straw, then caulking it together with 
resin and soaking it in an oil.87 The completed structure was then set ablaze to 
drive off the Chinese, probably through a combination of the dramatic effects of 
the burning dragon and the flames themselves.  
 Also dating from the Tây Sơn period, we have references to what one Eng-
lishman called “fire boats” or “fire floats.” While we have no detailed description 
of this weapon, it was probably a type of dummy vessel set afire and launched 
toward enemy boats.88 Like other fire weapons, these had to be used with care, 
for it was a weapon that could quite easily spell disaster for those who used it. 
The Trịnh forces which came into conflict with Chapman‟s mission in 1778 ap-
parently used such a device, but rough waters prevented the rafts from harming 
the English vessel. Fortunately for the Vietnamese side, the burning rafts did not 
harm their own ships. The Nguyễn were less fortunate when they attempted to use 
burning rafts against the Tây Sơn in the rivers near Sài Gòn in 1783. A sudden 
powerful northern wind turned the burning devices back toward the Nguyễn, 
sinking many of their vessels and forcing their troops to flee.89  
 This episode makes it clear that any time one wanted to use fire, attention had 
to be paid to weather patterns, and particularly the winds. The winds, when 
properly calculated, could render fire weapons particularly effective. Thus, for 
example, when Tây Sơn forces attacked the Nguyễn at Gia Định in 1783, the 
rebel armies sailed up the Sài Gòn River and took advantage of the rising waters 
and the accompanying tidal winds to shoot flaming arrows onto the Nguyễn holed 
up in the citadel. On the other hand, while winds might help speed one‟s fire-
arrows or flaming rafts toward the enemy, they might just as quickly turn against 
those employing such weapons, as the Nguyễn case cited previously so vividly 
demonstrated. 
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 Finally, in this same period, a European advisor to the Nguyễn forces during 
their long struggles with the Tây Sơn suggested what would have been the first 
use of aerial bombardment in Vietnamese history. The French mercenary, Alexis 
Olivier de Puynamel (known to the Vietnamese as Ông Tin) recommended com-
bining European technology with the more rudimentary weapon of fire to rain 
destruction on Tây Sơn forces holed up in a city that the Nguyễn were besieging. 
De Puynamel suggested that the Nguyễn employ a hot air balloon, which had 
been demonstrated to them around this time, and use it as a platform from which 
to drop incendiary devices on the interior of the besieged fort. Given the highly 
combustible materials used to construct buildings inside forts, as well as the like-
ly stockpiles of gunpowder, the effect could have been devastating. The Nguyễn 
ruler apparently decided against this indiscriminate use of fire, for fear of alienat-
ing potential supporters inside the Tây Sơn compound.90 Although the weapon 
was not used, the Tây Sơn were clearly aware of the Nguyễn access to hot air 
balloons, and recognized the potential that such technology held for warfare.91  
 
 
Water: Naval Issues 
 
Given the geographic realities that confront Việt Nam, with its very long coast-
line and sometimes daunting inland mountains pressing toward this coast, as well 
as numerous and extensive river systems, it is hardly surprising that waterborne 
warfare would be a central feature of Vietnamese traditional military technology 
and strategy. Travel between regions of Vietnam was almost always far more 
rapid on water than on land, and the northern and southern river deltas were also 
readily traveled by boat. Moreover, Vietnam‟s traditional enemies, the Chinese 
and the Chams, had considerable naval capabilities and used these in many of 
their attacks against the Vietnamese. Consequently, the Vietnamese had to devel-
op a means to counter such attacks. They became remarkably effective naval 
fighters, and it is no great wonder that the most famous Vietnamese military 
battles of the premodern era were virtually all fought on water. These included 
defeats of Chinese navies on the Bạch Đằng river in the tenth and thirteenth cen-
turies, the Tây Sơn riverine attacks on the capitols of Sài Gòn, Phú Xuân and 
Thăng Long in the 1770s and 1780s, and the decisive Tây Sơn defeat of a large 
Siamese naval fleet at the battle of Rạch-Gầm Xoài-mút in 1785. Throughout this 
period, the Vietnamese combined defensive measures of various types with the 
offensive capabilities of naval vessels of varying sizes and designs. 
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 One of the earliest, and arguably the most famous, naval battle in Vietnamese 
history took place in the early tenth century, and involved a combination of inno-
vative technology and military strategy. In 939, seeing the formidable Chinese 
fleet approaching his positions along the Bạch Đằng River, the Vietnamese admi-
ral, Ngô Quyển responded by combining simple technology with his knowledge 
of local conditions. He planted a series of iron-tipped poles in the river, invisible 
under the surface of the water. He then lured the Chinese ships further into the 
river during high tide when they could pass over the unseen stakes. Witnessing 
the apparent retreat of the Vietnamese forces, the Chinese ships pursued them 
inland along the river. When the tide turned, Ngô Quyển launched a furious 
counter-attack that sent the Chinese ships into a hasty retreat. Unaware of the 
stakes in the river, the Chinese ships became impaled on the iron tips of these 
poles as they headed back toward the river mouth, and many vessels sank or were 
destroyed by the pursuing Vietnamese.92  
 Subsequently, the use of simple but highly effective defensive naval technol-
ogies became an important element in Vietnamese warfare. In the thirteenth cen-
tury, the Trần family, which was from a coastal riverine area, and relied heavily 
on its naval capabilities to defend its position and state, seized control of the 
throne from the earlier Lý (1010-1225).93 It is no accident, then, that the Trần 
were later able to fight off the formidable Mongol armies along the rivers of the 
northern region in the 1280s. Indeed, the Trần admiral, Trần Hưng Đạo, used 
precisely the same tactic involving metal-tipped, submerged poles in the Bạch 
Đằng River that Ngô Quyển had used to such great effect in the tenth century. 
Once again, the Chinese navy was lured into the river, and once again their ships 
were ignominiously impaled on the hidden spikes, leading to a decisive Vietnam-
ese victory in 1288. Then, during the short reign of Hồ Quý Lý in the late four-
teenth century, the Vietnamese also planted stakes along coastal waters and at 
approaches to inland capitals to guard against potential Chinese and Cham naval 
attacks.94 When the Nguyễn moved south in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, they too protected their own coastal waters by planting wooden stakes to 
block ports. They also introduced an innovation in naval defense in the form of 
iron chains that could be strung across narrow harbors and river mouths. These 
could be lowered or raised as necessary to control access to these waters, provid-
ing a much more dynamic, if somewhat cumbersome, means of coastal defense.95 
 Indeed, as the Nguyễn moved further south, they greatly enhanced their naval 
resources and capabilities. To some extent this was dictated by terrain, for the 
central part of the country into which the Nguyễn family expanded in the six-
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teenth through eighteenth centuries, is the narrowest part of the country. In this 
region mountains often stretch down to the coast, creating isolated pockets of 
settlements, or at most are located only a few dozen kilometers inland. Under 
such circumstances travel by water was not only preferable, but was often an 
absolute necessity. Adjusting to their new environment, the Nguyễn became re-
nowned for their naval readiness and skills. A 1774 map of Nguyễn territories 
indicated the existence of more than 1,000 military boats of various sizes posted 
in the northern sections of the Nguyễn realm.96 By the latter part of the eight-
eenth century, numerous contemporary observers noted that, while the Nguyễn 
were at best mediocre when it came to land battles, they were an extremely dan-
gerous force on the coastal waters. When the Trịnh forces arrived in the south in 
1774, largely by land, a local scholar warned the commander of the northern 
forces: “The Nguyễn troops are not acquainted with foot battles, only their naval 
forces are skilled. You have come here from afar, and I beg of you not to com-
pete with them in their area of natural aptitude.”97 This warning came despite the 
fact that the Trịnh navies had themselves been quite formidable in the seven-
teenth century, and had “included ... 15,000 sailors scattered on 500 well-painted 
galleys having three cannons, one at the head and two at the stern.”98 As for these 
their vessels, “twenty-five rowers stood at each board, facing the head of the 
galley. The rest were fighting sailors.”99  
 Later, in the eighteenth century, and with the water-oriented Nguyễn forces as 
their enemy, the Tây Sơn armies regularly engaged the Nguyễn in naval confron-
tations. As unlikely as it might seem, the peasant wars of the Tây Sơn era were 
frequently decided by naval encounters, as well as by the mobility that boats 
provided to the armies of all parties. Both the Tây Sơn and their Nguyễn rivals 
had very large naval forces including hundreds of ships of various sizes, with the 
Tây Sơn side‟s strength considerably enhanced by the assistance of a fleet of 
Chinese pirate vessels.100 Each side achieved numerous naval victories during 
their confrontations. The Tây Sơn carried out successful naval attacks on the 
respective riverine capitols (or military headquarters) of the Nguyễn at Gia Định 
嘉 定, the Trịnh at Phú Xuân and the Trịnh/Lê at Thăng Long between 1780 and 
1786. In addition to these successes against domestic rivals, the Tây Sơn used 
their navies against external forces, most notably the Siamese. They used a com-
bination of their naval strength and intimate knowledge of the riverine terrain in 
the Mekong Delta area to ambush a Siamese navy that entered the country to 
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support the Nguyễn in early 1785. Having arrayed their troops in a pair of canals, 
Rạch-gầm and Xoài-mút, that fed into the Ba-lai river, the Tây Sơn navy lured 
the Siamese ships up the river, and then surrounded them at the designated am-
bush site. The Tây Sơn destroyed 95 percent of the 20,000-man Siamese army, 
dealing the Nguyễn a blow from which it would take several years to recover.101  
 Despite this and other important victories, the Tây Sơn were not always so 
successful in their naval engagements. Sometimes the Tây Sơn navies fell victim 
to the vagaries of weather conditions, while at others to the skill and firepower of 
their opponent. Several times during the campaigns of the 1770s, the Tây Sơn 
navies were in pursuit of Nguyễn forces, only to encounter major storms that 
either sunk their ships or pushed them off course, preventing them from catching 
the Nguyễn flotillas.102 Later, the Tây Sơn suffered two catastrophic naval de-
feats at the hands of the Nguyễn, in 1792 and 1800. Both times Nguyễn navies 
surprised the unsuspecting Tây Sơn forces at their major harbor of Thi Nại 市 奈, 
near Qui Nhơn, and each time burned at anchor the major part of the Tây Sơn 
fleet. By 1800, a European visitor noted the presence of more than 1,200 ships in 
the Nguyễn navy in and around Sài Gòn.103 Yet even in the face of major set-
backs and the growing Nguyễn fleet, the Tây Sơn, with the ongoing support of 
the Chinese pirate fleet, continued to rebuild their navies and to challenge the 
Nguyễn to the very end of the conflict in 1802.  
 Because of their important naval component, the military campaigns of the 
Tây Sơn conflict, both in the 1770s and early 1780s, as well as the later cam-
paigns of the 1790s, had rhythms that were dictated by the coastal winds, and 
were thus frequently referred to as the “Monsoon Wars.” Although each camp 
possessed large numbers of infantry troops, movement by sea was invariably 
more efficient than by land. Each side would attack when the prevailing winds 
favored the ready movement of their naval forces and transport vessels. Move-
ment by sea, however, meant that without a completely decisive victory, neither 
side would typically be able to sustain its attacks or easily consolidate its victo-
ries. To extend one‟s campaign, particularly against a distant target, was to risk 
missing the wind patterns that would enable a return to one‟s base. Failing to use 
these winds in a timely fashion meant that one‟s troops would be left extremely 
vulnerable to a subsequent counterattack. The 1790s saw several extended sieges 
of citadels that were probably prolonged precisely because the reliance on the 
winds made it difficult to provide adequate reinforcements or relief until the 
winds shifted once again. It was because of this wind-dictated pattern that 
Nguyễn progress in the wars was very slow. This was the despair of European 
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advisors, who constantly chided Nguyễn Ánh for being overly cautious, while 
perhaps not fully appreciating the complexities of the monsoon-driven military 
logistics.104 
 
* * * 
 
Specifically in terms of technology, it is quite difficult to generalize about the 
nature of Vietnamese naval vessels, particularly for the period prior to the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. There are simply too few accurate descriptions of 
these boats. Furthermore, it is difficult to separate “Vietnamese” from “Chinese” 
technology during the period of Chinese domination, if such a distinction is 
worth  making. No doubt Chinese naval technology being employed in their 
southern domains was influenced by local skills. Even before the arrival of the 
Chinese the Vietnamese were developing naval technologies in response to their 
aquatic environs. The very earliest depictions of what be considered indigenous 
Vietnamese naval technology are those found on bronze drums from the Đông 
Sơn culture of the first millennium BC. The designs on some drums reveal low-
slung vessels, curved at the ends and rowed by two or more oarsmen, while an-
other stood at the stern of the vessel to steer it. Others show quite clearly the 
presence of cabins as well as platforms from which archers could fire their weap-
ons.105 Nguyễn Việt, in a 1983 study of Vietnamese naval warfare, speculated 
that boats of this early period ranged in size from three to ten meters, with the 
smaller vessels transporting between four and six people.106  
Larger ships began to be developed in the first millennium AD. Keith Taylor 
describes “high-decked” warships as being part of the Chinese military force in 
Vietnamese territories in the early fifth century.107 Later, in the ninth century, 
Taylor notes that the Chinese had improved their southern navy to include ships 
propelled by twenty-three oarsmen, and manned by twenty-five soldiers and two 
cross-bowmen.108 The Vietnamese too began to construct larger vessels. Nguyễn 
Việt has conjectured that Vietnamese warships of the period from the early ninth 
to the late thirteenth century were up to 20 meters in length and 4 meters wide, 
with 32 rowers and 25 soldiers.109  
 Major innovations were then introduced in the late fourteenth century by Hồ 
Quý Lý, who had seized the throne from the Trần family. He developed a new 
type of military vessel divided into two decks, rather than the traditional single, 
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high-decked ship. The upper deck accommodated soldiers, while the lower deck 
was reserved for oarsmen who powered the craft.110 This double-decked design 
appears to have been unique to this period, or at least quite unusual, for descrip-
tions of later Vietnamese naval vessels in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
describe only single-decked ships. An early seventeenth-century Jesuit mission-
ary engraving of a Nguyễn battleship, for example, shows it to be a single-decked 
vessel propelled by at least 25 oarsmen on a side, though it does not make clear 
precisely where soldiers stood or where cannons might be mounted.111 Dutch 
observers similarly reported that galleys in the middle of the seventeenth century 
featured 64 soldiers and a variety of mounted guns.112 When Pierre Poivre visit-
ed the south in the 1750s, he noted that larger Nguyễn vessels had between 40 
and 60 oarsmen.113 Numbers on this magnitude were confirmed by Charles 
Chapman, who reported in 1778 that a Tây Sơn mandarin controlled “four gallies 
rowing between forty and fifty oars each.”114  
 In addition to providing more precise indications of the size of Vietnamese 
vessels, by the eighteenth century European visitors to Việt Nam began to pro-
duce considerably more detailed description of the nature and construction of 
these ships. Thus, for example, in the late eighteenth century, a visiting English-
man gave the following description of some elements of Vietnamese boat-
construction: 
 
That particular branch of the arts in which the Cochinchi-
nese may be said to excel at the present day is naval archi-
tecture, for which, however, they are not a little indebted to 
the size and quality of the timber employed for the purpose. 
Their row-gallies for pleasure are remarkably fine vessels. 
These boats, from fifty to eighty feet in length, are some-
times composed of five single planks, each extending from 
one extremity to the other, the edges morticed, kept tight by 
wooden pins, and bound firm by twisted fibers of bamboo, 
without either ribs or any kind of timbers. At the stem and 
stern they are raised a considerable height, and are curiously 
carved into monstrous figures of dragons and serpents, or-
namented with gilding and painting.115  
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Although this account describes civilian boats, it is likely that similar construc-
tion techniques were also employed in the crafting of military vessels. John Bar-
row, the author of this description, also noted the Vietnamese use of bulkheads in 
their larger cargo vessels, which, while allowing for the separation of various 
goods for transport, also protected the ships against sinking in the event that one 
section of the hull was breached.116 Another account by an earlier English visitor 
reported the following, specifically about military vessels he had seen in the 
possession of the Trịnh: 
 
The largest of these gallies was about fifty feet long and ten 
or twelve broad, the head and stern sharpening off to a 
point; they were armed with spears from fifteen to twenty 
feet in length and matchlocks some of which had large bores 
and turned upon swivels, with great quantities of power and 
balls made up in bamboo cartridges.117  
 
As all of these cases make clear, military vessels of the premodern period were 
typically powered by oarsmen, particularly for riverine battles, where their speed 
and maneuverability were indispensable. They could also be used quite effective-
ly along coastal waters as well, for as Reid has pointed out, the Southeast Asian 
coastal waters were relatively sheltered.118 Sailing ships were more commonly 
used for moving along the coastal waters, where they were at the mercy of the 
prevailing winds of the monsoons. Some Vietnamese historians, such as Nguyễn 
Việt, have argued that ships of the northern Trịnh were better suited to river trav-
el, while those of the southern Nguyễn were designed for better ocean mobili-
ty.119 Given the geography of each place, with the contrast between the river-
laced northern plains and the frequently narrow coastal region controlled by the 
Nguyễn in this period, such a division in boat types would be a logical assump-
tion. Việt concedes, however, that while the hypothesis makes sense, descriptions 
of the boats and surviving sketches by European observers are not precise enough 
to verify this speculation. 
 While the Nguyễn already had considerable naval capabilities in the eight-
eenth century, they were quick to recognize some of the advantages that came 
with the larger and heavier European vessels. Thus, they employed European 
mercenaries and vessels for their campaigns against the Tây Sơn beginning in the 
late 1780s. The Nguyễn were not content to rely solely on these borrowed Euro-
pean vessels. According to one account, sometime in the 1790s Nguyễn Ánh 
purchased a European vessel, then had it dismantled, and the design copied so 
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that his craftsmen could produce three more identical vessels.120 The Nguyễn 
also drew on European technology and began to cover at least some of their ves-
sels in bronze, making them more resistant to the small caliber guns typically 
mounted on enemy vessels, and most capable of successfully targeting Nguyễn 
boats. This would also appear to have constituted a psychological advantage, 
probably derived from the sight of cannonballs apparently bouncing off of the 
bronze-clad vessels. When the Tây Sơn Emperor Quang Trung 光 中 rallied his 
troops in a 1792 edict, he acknowledge the impact of such vessels by comment-
ing that “These ships of bronze ... of theirs are things that are strange, and they 
must be submitted for me to know (about them).”121 The Tây Sơn appear to have 
responded to the Nguyễn naval challenge, for by 1801 there were reports that the 
Tây Sơn navy included vessels with between 50 and 60 cannons mounted on 
them, marking a substantial increase in their firepower.122 For their part, the 
Nguyễn were mounting between 26 and 46 cannons on some of their locally-
produced vessels.123  
 Finally, even as they were copying the European ships, the Nguyễn appear to 
have been crafting much larger vessels of local design. A description of these 
larger ships, said to be developed to carry three hundred people, and comprising 
three decks, was provided by a Japanese shipwreck victim who spent several 
months in Nguyễn territory near Sài Gòn in late 1794 and early 1795: 
 
These are ships in the Chinese style with masts of 36 parts. 
Each vessel is for three hundred people ... Several dozen 
halberds and lances are planted (as rails) and the bows are 
all of small dimensions and very strong ... The three levels 
of the ships are: the lower level, on which both the front and 
rear have eight large cannons; the middle level with three 
medium-sized cannons both in the front and rear; and the 
upper level with, in the front, sixteen guns with 20 Mục (55 
gr) ball, and decorated barrels. These guns are placed on 
wheeled supports, which allows them to be aimed in all di-
rections.124 
 
From this it is clear that the Vietnamese continued to develop substantial naval 
capability independent of European influence, even as they had access to Euro-
pean advisors and technologies. 
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Beasts of War: Elephants and Horses 
 
To consider the Vietnamese traditional arsenal more fully, we must expand our 
scope to include other types of military resources, including that distinctive 
weapon of mainland Southeast Asia—the elephant. The elephant was one of the 
greatest Vietnamese military assets. Not only were elephants powerful and diffi-
cult to kill on the battlefield, but troops mounted on elephants could travel with 
great speed and had the advantage of being able to survey the battlefield from a 
vantage point considerably higher than that of their (typically) horse-mounted 
opponents. Moreover, an elephant could carry as many as four armed soldiers at 
a time, making it a formidable fighting element. Care for and training of ele-
phants became a specialized branch of the Vietnamese military structure, and the 
ownership of elephants, like other weapons, was severely circumscribed by the 
state. Moreover, given the importance of the elephants, fiscal allotments for up-
keep of elephants were precisely regulated according to their size. The im-
portance of elephants in the Vietnamese military structure is revealed by the fact 
that some of the more prominent were given elaborate funerals upon their deaths. 
 The use of the elephant in battle is a defining characteristic of traditional 
Vietnamese military strategy, and an element that appeared very early in the 
ranks of Vietnamese armies. Already in the third century BC, Chinese armies 
noted the presence of these animals among Vietnamese forces. In the first century 
AD, the two Trưng 徵 sisters who rose up against Chinese occupation led their 
armies astride elephants. Subsequent Vietnamese military heroines likewise en-
tered battle on the backs of pachyderms, including Triều Ẩu 趙 嫗 in the third 
century and much later Bùi Thị Xuân 裴 氏 春 in the Tây Sơn period. This is not 
to suggest that female generals were primarily responsible for maneuvering ele-
phants into battle, for female generals appear to have been uncommon in Viet-
namese history. Rather, the presence of elephants, as well as the participation 
(however infrequent) of women in Vietnamese armies, must be seen as distinc-
tively Southeast Asian elements in the realm of traditional Vietnamese war-
fare.125  
 Along with its obvious physical advantages, possession of this beast of war 
gave Vietnamese armies a substantial psychological advantage, particularly over 
Chinese soldiers, who, if mounted at all, rode on horses. In at least one encounter 
between elephant-mounted Vietnamese troops and horse-riding Chinese forces, 
but probably in many others as well, Chinese horses were intimidated at the sight 
and size of the Vietnamese elephants and stampeded into disarray.126 Although 
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the Vietnamese gained a considerable advantage with their elephants, at times the 
Chinese were able to adapt to this threat. During the Ming invasion of the early 
fifteenth century, their forces were able to scare off the Vietnamese elephants by 
crafting lion masks for their horses to wear.127 During their next invasion, in the 
late eighteenth century, the Chinese similarly sought means to confront the south-
ern pachyderms. Sun Shiyi 孫 士 毅 (1720-1796), the Qing general who led his 
troops into Việt Nam to restore the last Lê Emperor, specifically warned his 
troops about Vietnamese war elephants: “When the southerners go into battle 
they frequently use elephants. Elephants are not indigenous to our country and in 
the past our soldiers, not acquainted with these creatures, turned and fled every 
time. They did not know that elephants, although very strong, are creatures of 
flesh and blood that cannot compete with our guns. If you see an elephant in 
battle, at a distance use guns and at close range, use swords. If you can wound 
them, they will flee.”128 This suggests that the psychological impact of Vietnam-
ese war elephants affected not only Chinese horses, but their soldiers as well, and 
although the Chinese could develop antidotes to the Vietnamese war elephants, 
these were not always effective. 
 Visitors to Việt Nam frequently commented on the role and imposing battle 
presence of these elephants. Samuel Baron, a Eurasian trader who traveled to the 
northern capital region in the late seventeenth century, reported that there were 
between three and four hundred elephants in the northern armies.129 The Chinese 
Buddhist monk, Dashan, who visited Nguyễn territories in the late seventeenth 
century, observed that “elephants have made many contributions to the victories 
achieved in the course of battles against Đông Kinh and Champa.”130 Somewhat 
later, during the Tây Sơn era, the rebel forces were able to use elephants to psy-
chological, if not military advantage, by using boats to introduce them into their 
battles with the Nguyễn in the watery reaches of the Mekong Delta region. Ele-
phants were not indigenous to this area, where lengthy canals and wide rivers 
made their movement impractical. Consequently, their presence in the ranks of 
Tây Sơn armies was a considerable shock to locally recruited soldiers, and prob-
ably a considerable surprise to other Nguyễn forces, acquainted with the crea-
tures, but not expecting to find them in the marshes of the south. In any case, the 
Nguyễn in the far south were to begin to establish their own elephant corps, so 
that by 1800 their armies reportedly had 200 elephants of their own.131  
 In addition to elephants, the Vietnamese also used other animals in a variety 
of military roles. Most notable among these were horses. Although elephants 
were regularly deployed by Vietnamese armies in all parts of the country, and 
provided physical as well as psychological benefits, the numbers found in any 
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given army were always measured only in the tens or hundreds. Many more sol-
diers traveled by horseback, when terrain and logistics permitted. Unlike ele-
phants, horses were readily available, relatively easy to train, and far easier to 
feed. There are stories from both north and south about particular military leaders 
noted for their use of horses. The eighteenth-century northern rebel, Nguyễn Hữu 
Cầu 阮 有 求, was alleged to have as an inseparable companion, a “spirit horse,” 
that he had been able to tame.132 Later, the Tây Sơn leader, Nguyễn Nhạc, was 
also cited for his way with horses, and when Charles Chapman visited his court in 
1778, he specifically asked for the next European trade mission to send him a 
horse. Nhạc indicated that price was no object, as long as the horse was grey and 
had finely pointed ears.133  
 Despite their long history of employing horses in warfare, Vietnamese de-
ployment of cavalry forces left early European observers unimpressed. One early 
visitor in the later seventeenth century commented that the horses of the Nguyễn 
were chiefly for parade rather than military purposes.134 Another noted that 
“There is no cavalry, but some chiefs and their attendants, around 200 strong, 
ride on horseback armed with lances and sabres.”135 Moreover, when Poivre 
visited in 1749-1750, he noted that “there are ... horses, but stocky and poorly 
built, which are seldom used because of the uneven lie of the land and the many 
rivers and marshes which intersect it.”136 Even as he made this observation, the 
Nguyễn had already established a school for training their soldiers in horseback 
riding in 1700, and appear to have begun to treat their cavalry more seriously. 
Horses were an important factor in subsequent wars of the Tây Sơn period and 
particularly valued by the Nguyễn who were largely cut off from access to the 
preferred elephants. Indeed, in 1794, as the Nguyễn were battling the Tây Sơn, 
Nguyễn Ánh decreed that selling horses to foreigners would be a capital of-
fense.137 The Nguyễn, short of elephants and horses during this time even took to 
using water buffalo to transport troops. At one point, their army was reported to 
have 6,000 men, comprising 24 squadrons, going into battle on buffaloes.138 
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Technologies of Logistics, Armor and Signaling 
 
Alongside the more dramatic military devices already discussed, existed less 
prominent, but equally important, technologies. These ranged from signaling 
devices and watch towers, to transportation aids and simple tools of various sorts. 
Though sometimes overlooked, these technologies must be viewed as playing 
crucial roles for Vietnamese armies and their commanders during the early mod-
ern period. These devices enhanced the capabilities of Vietnamese forces, but 
also constituted indispensable elements of Vietnamese military preparedness. 
Without the services of some of these minor technological capabilities, the Viet-
namese would have been far less mobile, far less organized and indeed, much 
more vulnerable to enemy troops both internal and external. 
 Among these technologies of logistics were those related to the gathering and 
exchange of information, with signaling being particularly important. During the 
Tây Sơn wars, and probably well before that, the Vietnamese used a signal horn 
to send messages between scattered forces. It was described by one European 
observer as: 
 
a small instrument for giving war signals during the night or 
in the woods. Its sound is small, and yet it can be heard for 
nearly one league or more when conditions are right. It is 
only the commanders or some sub-commanders of the army 
who have the right to use it, and it is with this [horn] that 
they give the signals to attack or retreat ... The sound is pro-
duced by breathing in and out without tiring oneself.139  
 
In addition to this horn, another sounding device used to signal to soldiers was 
the gong, which the Nguyễn used to summon troops in certain areas.140 For send-
ing messages over even greater distances, the Vietnamese used signal fires. These 
would sometimes be placed on coastal high points, where they could be seen by 
those awaiting the signal. The Tây Sơn armies used this method in their 1786 
campaign against the Trịnh. After their troops had taken Phú Xuân, and their 
leader, Nguyễn Huệ 阮 惠 had decided to advance the offensive against Thăng 
Long, the Tây Sơn advance naval forces moved up the coast to capture the Trịnh 
storehouses at Vị Hoàng 渭 潢. Once these had been captured, a signal fire was 
lit as a message to the rear forces that the preliminary attack had been successful, 
and that the second prong of the attack could be launched.141 For their part, the 
Nguyễn also used towers for signaling and as look-out sites. In the seventeenth 
century, they built a series of coastal watchtowers in preparation for anticipated 
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attacks from the Trịnh.142 Somewhat later, the Nguyễn chronicles report the 
construction of fire signal towers at the coastal areas of Cần-giờ, Đồng-tranh, and 
Vâng-tàu in 1788.143  
 An even earlier use of observation watchtowers dates to the last years of the 
Vietnamese campaigns against the Ming occupation in the 1420s, when Chinese 
troops had been forced to retreat into fortified positions. The main Chinese cita-
del was at Đông Đô (東 都—the Eastern capital), which the Vietnamese then 
besieged. Lying along a river, it was difficult for the Vietnamese to find a van-
tage point from which to observe movements within the Chinese fort. Then, in 
early 1427, the Vietnamese ingeniously built a floating tower, higher than the 
citadel walls, which they were then able to use in spying on enemy movements in 
the Chinese camp.144 In addition to these towers, other ancillary technologies 
related to besieging citadels developed during the same campaign. Vietnamese 
forces used an array of siege technologies learned from the Chinese including 
building earthen hills around the city to fire into it, tunneling into the city, and 
deploying assault carts.145 They also employed other technologies learned from 
the Chinese during earlier encounters including such devices as catapults and 
scaling ladders.146  
 While signal and watch towers could be used to summon troops or observe 
troop mobilizations, other technologies directly supported the transport of the-
seforces. Mention has already been made of the important role that naval 
transport played in moving armies across coastal waters, as well as the use of 
elephants, horses, and buffalo for movement across land. Armies could also, 
however, be moved rapidly with much simpler tools. In the late eighteenth centu-
ry, the Tây Sơn armies gained a reputation for traveling overland at speeds that 
were virtually incomprehensible to their enemies The primary technology that 
allowed them to do this involved using hammocks as movable bunks. In this 
arrangement, three soldiers would travel together as a team. Two men would 
carry the third soldier in a hammock suspended between them. The three would 
would then rotate in shifts, taking turns sleeping in the hammock. In this manner, 
the Tây Sơn armies were able to travel virtually without stopping, for great dis-
tances. In one instance in 1786, Nguyễn Nhạc apparently traveled from Qui Nhơn 
to Thăng Long, a distance of roughly 1000 kilometers in only ten days. This 
speed made the Tây Sơn appear almost supernatural to populations witness to 
their movements. According to one account, northern observers at the time said 
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of Nguyễn Huệ: “Seeing him going north, going south, he has the appearance of a 
magical spirit. No one can comprehend it.”147  
 In terms of mobility, another very important element of Vietnamese military 
technology was the construction of floating bridges using bamboo pontoons. 
Such bridges would typically be used to permit the rapid movement of troops 
across rivers, rather than waiting for ferryboats, which could move only small 
numbers of troops at a time. These floating bridges would be constructed quickly 
and in a temporary fashion to facilitate troop movement, rather than being erected 
as permanent structures. The Nguyễn and Tây Sơn made use of such structures in 
their campaigns in the Mekong delta region, where numerous rivers often made 
the movement of land troops extremely difficult or time-consuming. While highly 
useful for troop movement, such structures were also inherently vulnerable if they 
were not used properly or were insufficiently guarded. For example, there are 
several accounts that tell of such floating bridges being sabotaged, causing troops 
crossing them to fall into rivers and perish.148 The Chinese troops that invaded 
Việt Nam in support of the Lê in 1788-1789 constructed such a bridge to move 
their own troops back and forth from the northern to the southern banks of the 
Red River. When the Tây Sơn counterattacked, and the Chinese troops attempted 
to flee across one of these bridges in their panic, the excessive weight of the 
fleeing troops caused the structure to collapse, drowning thousands of Chinese 
soldiers. 
 As they moved their troops to prepare for battle, the Vietnamese also sought 
to protect their soldiers on the battlefield, both through shields and armor. At the 
famous battle of Ngọc Hồi (near Hà Nội) in 1789, when the Tây Sơn armies of 
the Emperor Quang Trung (1788-1792) were fighting against the Chinese, the 
Vietnamese leader developed a new type of portable wall. He ordered his men to 
create large, mobile shields out of long wooden planks. These were then carried 
by ten men, who could carry the large shield with one hand and wield weapons 
with the other. Chinese efforts to rain down fire on these shields to set them 
ablaze were thwarted by wind conditions.149 In addition to such elaborate and 
specialized shields, Vietnamese troops almost certainly carried wooden shields 
into battle with them, much like their Chinese counterparts during this and other 
encounters. A seventeenth-century engraving by a European visitor depicts 
northern troops carrying large, curved shields.150 In the nineteenth century, the 
Vietnamese had shields of rattan as well as of steel, both of which types were 
probably in use in earlier periods as well.151  
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 The Vietnamese also used different types of protective armor, though virtual-
ly no specific information about this survives, and in most cases such armor was 
probably reserved only for military commanders. The average foot soldier in the 
traditional period wore little more than a simple tunic and trousers. Poivre left a 
description of the uniforms he encountered at the Nguyễn court in 1750, noting 
that their tunics had words on them indicating to which regiment a soldier be-
longed.152 Then in the 1790s, John Barrow provided a brief description of a Tây 
Sơn soldier, noting that “In general, a kerchief tied about the head, somewhat in 
the shape of a turban, a loose smock frock, with a pair of drawers, constitute the 
dress of a soldier ...”153 With regard to protective headgear, the Đại Việt Sử Ký 
Toan Thư 大 越 史 記 全 書 recorded that the helmet used by Vietnamese troops 
of the tenth century was square and made of leather, with the four sides sewn 
together, and that it was narrow in front and broad in the back. The same sources 
go on to note that this type of helmet continued to be in use into the Lê period 
(1428-1789).154 When Poivre visited the Nguyễn territories in 1750, he com-
mented on the headgear he observed on Vietnamese soldiers. He described it as 
being made of a type of lacquered wood, which was decorated in silver paint. 
The form of these helmets he noted, “is like that of Flemish or Dutch hats, with 
the exception that the brim is of a uniform curvature, and that at the top of the hat 
is raised a type of ornament of the same material as the hat itself, and in a form 
somewhat like the head of a cane.”155  
 Finally, in terms of logistics, brief mention must be made of the role that 
mapping played in Vietnamese warfare. Alongside more visible technologies, the 
capacity to produce maps must also be ranked as critically important to Vietnam-
ese military endeavors. Without good maps, military campaigns would be guided 
by guesswork about often complex topographies. While military commanders 
could sometimes rely on informants with knowledge of local conditions, maps 
drawn up in advance were of considerably greater utility. Such maps were partic-
ularly important during campaigns against distant targets, such as the wars with 
the Chams to the south. During those wars the Vietnamese frequently found 
themselves fighting on terrain and under conditions with which they were not 
familiar, making maps all the more necessary. When the Chinese invaded Việt 
Nam in the late eighteenth century, they reportedly had no good maps of the 
Vietnamese terrain, were forced to rely on border merchants to guide them, and 
their subsequent defeat may partly be ascribed to their lack of good cartographic 
information.156  
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 Unfortunately, Vietnamese cartography has still been little studied, though 
two good examinations of the topic do exist.157 The first is John K. Whitmore‟s 
substantial article “Cartography in Vietnam,” which is part of the University of 
Chicago‟s comprehensive History of Cartography series.158 Whitmore‟s article 
provides a very useful and thoughtful survey of the Vietnamese tradition of map-
ping, and is well illustrated with representative maps. The second is Tâm Quach-
Langlet‟s “La perception des frontières dans l‟Ancien Viêtnam à travers quelques 
cartes vietnamiennes et occidentales,” which considers Vietnamese as well as 
early European maps, particularly as they depict Vietnamese boundary lines.159 
Finally, although not an analytical study, there exists the indispensable reproduc-
tion of what has become known as the Hồng Đức Bản Đồ 洪 德 版 圖—Atlas of 
the Hồng Đức Period. A published version has been edited by Trương Bưu Lâm, 
and includes photographic negative reproductions of the major collection of 
traditional Vietnamese maps along with annotation and translations into modern 
Vietnamese. From these three sources, a brief outline of the Vietnamese carto-
graphic tradition as it pertains to military usage can be made.  
 Although the earliest extant Vietnamese maps appear to date only to the six-
teenth century, we know from other sources that maps were produced as early as 
the late eleventh century, when Lý Thương Kiệt produced a map of the boundary 
with Champa as part of his ongoing campaigns against the southern state.160 A 
century later saw the compilation of a more extensive atlas of coastal and frontier 
regions, the Nam Bắc Phiên-dới Địa Đố 南 北 番 移 地 圖—Atlas of the Bound-
aries to the North and South. The surviving maps from this early period are fre-
quently tied to military campaigns. Lê Thánh Tông used maps of Champa during 
his campaigns in the 1470s, and when his maps proved inadequate for the pur-
poses of the campaign, he relied on local advice for producing more accurate 
ones.161 These and others were itinerary or route maps, specifically to be used in 
directing the movement of troops over particular terrain. They indicated the loca-
tions of bodies of water and mountains, as well as known bridges, ferries, and 
structures of various types. Somewhat later, the Trịnh developed maps of the 
northern Cao-bằng 高 平 region in the late 1660s, as part of their campaign to 
oust the Mạc from their border redoubt.162  
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David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 478-508. 
159 Tâm Quach-Langlet, “La perception des frontières dans l‟Ancien Viêtnam à tra-
vers quelques cartes vietnamiennes et occidentales,” in Les frontières du Vietnam, ed. P. 
B. Lafont (Paris: L‟Harmattan, 1989), 25-62. 
160 Whitmore “Cartography,” 480. 
161 Ibid., 490. 
162 Ibid., 487. 
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 To the south, the Nguyễn rulers in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, 
and even the short-lived Tây Sơn dynasty all had maps of various types that 
clearly served military purposes. The Nguyễn compiled their Bình Nam Đồ 平 南 
圖 (Maps of the Pacification of the South) at some point in the mid-seventeenth 
century, possibly in 1654.163 These maps depict fortifications, troop strengths 
and traversable rivers. The Tây Sơn map, identified by Whitmore, dates to 1798 
and bears the name Đại Man Quốc Đồ 大 蠻 國 圖—Map of the Country of the 
Great Barbarians. This map depicts not only Vietnamese territory, but other parts 
of the interior mainland as well, included indications of the number of days travel 
required to move from point to point. It is, as Whitmore notes, the only pre-
nineteenth-century map of which we know that includes coverage of countries 
outside Việt Nam.164 Given that the Tây Sơn armies had campaigned in the Lao 
territories in the early 1790s it is not surprising that they would have developed a 
map to assist them in these campaigns, no doubt supplemented by information 
gathered during their travels in the interior. This map like those used by earlier 
rulers since the eleventh century, was a very important element of Vietnamese 
technology as it related to success in warfare. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This survey hopefully makes clear, that the Vietnamese made extensive use of a 
combination of rudimentary and more sophisticated military technology in the 
period prior to 1802. Most notably, they took advantage of terrain and water to 
give their armies advantages over external enemies. Ramparts and citadels as 
defensive structures were an early and ongoing aspect of the Vietnamese ap-
proach to military strategy and technology, and were central to Vietnamese mili-
tary planning. The use of fire, both in its elemental form and in artillery, was also 
of great significance in a region where the use of wood as a construction material 
made incendiary devices particularly effective. Naval warfare was among the 
most important elements of Vietnamese military strategy during this period, as 
reflected in the many notable naval encounters described in the historical record. 
In some instances, even popular uprisings, like that of the Tây Sơn, relied heavily 
on naval forces throughout their campaigns, as monsoon patterns dictated the 
rhythms of these military confrontations. Furthermore, elephants, those peculiarly 
important beasts of traditional warfare in mainland Southeast Asia, were another 
important component of the Vietnamese approach to warfare, both in domestic 
conflicts and against the Chinese, where they provided an important psychologi-
cal advantage to the Vietnamese. Finally, Vietnamese armies benefited from a 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 493 
164 Ibid., 496. 
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range of less dramatic, but equally important, logistical technologies from pon-
toon bridges and signaling towers to battle shields and campaign maps. 
 This article constitutes merely an introduction to some elements of traditional 
Vietnamese military technology. While much ink has been spilled about the wars 
in Việt Nam during the twentieth century, little attention has yet been given, 
particularly by American and European scholars, to military events and technolo-
gy of earlier periods. Substantial work remains to be done, and between the Viet-
namese historical record, the increasingly important archeological materials, and 
the accounts of foreign visitors, both European and Asian, there is a wealth of 
source material on which to base further studies. Hopefully this article will help 
stimulate efforts in this direction, and perhaps not merely studies of Vietnamese 
military technology, but indeed of Vietnamese technology in other fields as well, 
from architecture and agriculture to music and pottery. 
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